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STATUTE CHALLENGED
Title 34, Chapter 10, Section 6(a), Utah Code Annotated
1953
34-10-6. Separation from pay roll- Resvgnati,on or suspension of employment - Penalty. (a) Whenever an
employer separates an employee from his pay roll the
unpaid wages or compensation of such employee shall
become due immediately, and the employer shall pay
such wages to the employee within 24 hours of the time
of separation at the specified place of payment.
In the case of any failure to pay wages due an employee within 24 hours of a demand therefor, the wages
of such employee shall continue from the date of separation until paid, but in no event to exceed 60 days,
at the same rate which said employee received at the
time of the separation. The employee may recover the
penalty thus accruing to him in a civil action. Said
action must be commenced within 60 days from the
date of separation; provided, however, that any employe-e who has not made a demand for payment shall
not be entitled to any such penalty under this paragraph.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ELBA tTUSTICE, LA WRE~CE JUSTICE, and ARTHUR A \rERETT,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

Case No.
9326

STANDARD GILSONITE ICOMP ANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF F kC'TS
This is an action filed by plaintiff under the provisions of Title 3-±, Chapter 10, Section 6, Utah Code
Annotated, (1953), to recover alleged 'vages and the
sum of $2,715.00 as penalty for an alleged failure to
pay said alleged wages upon demand made by plaintiffs
based upon said statute. (Record pp. 1-3)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

Defendant is a Utah corporation with its principal
place of business and the office of its president and
general manager, Mr. Robert Pinder, in Salt Lake City,
Utah. (Record p. 1)
On approximately August 31, 1959, Pinder instructed one Ralph McMullin, defendant's foreman, residing in Roosevelt, l~tah, to obtain the services of an
independent mining contractor to open up a dormant
mine shaft on defendant's Ouray claim near Ouray,
Utah. Consequently on September 1, 1959, McMullin
negotiated with plaintiff Elba Justice, with whom an
oral contract was formed for the mining of ore at a
specified rate per ton. Other terms of the contract were
agreed upon. (Record p. 8).
Subseqeunt to an inspection of the mine site, Justice
informed McMullin that certain preliminary operations
such as "mucking out" and ''timbering" would be required before actual mining operations could be commenced. On September 7, Justice began working. (Record
p. 1). On September 8 he was joined by his son, plaintiff
Lawrence Justice, and on September 15 by plaintiff
Arthur Averett, both of whom were continually under
the control and supervision of Elba Justice. (Record
p. 2).
On September 30, plaintiffs made a demand upon
defendant for payment of $1,000.00 as wages, asserting
that they were employees, which demand was denied on
the belief that no employer-employee relationship
existed bet,veen plaintiffs and defendant, the services
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rPndered by plaintiffs being performed as preliminary
to eonunencing mining operations pursuant to the oral
contract bet,v·een plaintiff Elba Justice and defendant
eorporation.
J>laintiffs performed their last \vork at the 1nine on
()eto her 1. (Record p. 23). On Octo her 5, Pinder met
with Elba Justice and Ralph O'Neill, defendant's rnine
~uperintendent, at Justice's home in l\fyton, Utah, for
the purpose of discussing the dispute as to the status
of plaintiffs and any amount due to them from defendant. Subsequently on October 9, Pinder signed and mailed
to Elba Justice defendant's check in the amount of
$5:20.00 \vith the legend "Payment in full, Ouray claim
eontract." (Record p. 9 and Exhibit 2). This check \vas
retained by Justice and not returned to defendant until
October 29.
On October 15, defendant received from plaintiffs'
attorney a letter notifying defendant of plaintiffs' claim
for wages and threatening legal action not only for
the wages clairned but also for the statutory penalty
should defendant fail immediately to respond \vith payInent of plaintiffs' claim for alleged wages. However,
suit \vas not filed on plaintiffs' asserted claim until
Xovember 30, 1959, (Record p. 23) the last day allowed
for filing under the limitations provision of the statute
in question.
Trial was had on the merits and judgment was
entered against defendant for the wages claimed, plus
interest, together with a penalty of $2,715.00, (Record
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p. 26) from which judgment defendant has appealed
insofar as application of the penalty is concerned.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Defendant bases its appeal upon the following
points, to-wit:

POINT I.
THE RULING OF 'THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW
APPLYING 'TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH
OODE ANNOTATED (1953) TO THE CASE AT BAR WAS
ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A. SAID STA·TUTE RELA'TES ONLY TO DISPU'TES BETWEEN ACKNOWLEDGED EMPLOYERS AND
EMPLOYEES REGARDING AMOUNTS DUE AS WAGES,
AND DOES NOT APPLY TO BONA FIDE DISPUTES AS
·TO THE EXISTEN,CE O·F AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELA1TIONSHIP.

POINT II.
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW UPHOLDING THE CONSTITU·TIONALI'TY OF TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953)
WAS ERRO·R AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A. SAID STA'TUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON
ITS FACE, CONSTITUTING A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW TO
EMPLOYERS BY VIRTUALLY DENYING TO THEM THEIR
1
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DAY IN COURT UNDER THREAT OF EXCESSIVE PENALTY.
B. SAID STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
APPLIED TO THE CASE AT BAR, CONSTITUTING A
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,
AN ALLEGED EMPLOYER, WHERE THERE EXISTS A
BONA FIDE DISPUTE AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN
E:\IPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, BY VIRTUALLY
DENYING TO IT ITS DAY IN COURT UNDER THREAT
OF EXCESSIVE PENALTY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW
APPLYING 'TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED (1953) TO THE CASE AT BAR WAS
ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A. SAID STATUTE RELATES ONLY TO DISPUITES BETWEEN ACKNOWLEDGED EMPLOYERS AND
EMPLOYEES REGARDING AMOUNTS DUE AS WAGES,
AND DOES NOT APPLY TO BONA FIDE DISPUTES AS
TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELA'TIONSHIP.

The first question which presents itself upon making
an inquiry into the propriety of the ruling of the court
belo\\"', is whether the statute used by the lo\ver court
to penalize the defendant was applicable at all. A careful examination of the wording of Title 34, ·Chapter 10,
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Section 6(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953) reveals that
only when an "employer" separates an "employee"
from his "payroll" can the statute be applied to inflict
a penalty upon one from whom wages are claimed to
be due. Sound reasoning leads to the inescapable conclusion that only 'vhen there exists such an employeremployee relationship clearly understood by both
parties to be such, and- where the employee is in fact
separated from his employer's payroll, should a court
use this severe statute to punish a wilfully wrongdoing
employer. This conclusion is supported by Chicago Rock
Island & Pacific Railway Company vs. D. L. Russell,
173 Ark. 398, 292 S. W. 375 (1927), which sets forth
the general rule that penalty statutes must be strictly
construed (being penal in nature) and must not be
applied against one not coming strictly within their
provisions. Accord: BiJelstein vs. Hawkins, ________ La. ________ ,
50 So. 2d 523 (1951); Chester et al vs. Davis, ________ La.
________ , 66 So. 2d 377 ( 1953). Applying this doctrine
to the instant case it must be concluded that unless the
plaintiffs here were clearly employees, on the payroll
of the defendant company and severed therefrom by
defendant in the capacity of an employer, the penalty
statute cannot properly be applied.
That defendant did not in fact regard plaintiffs
as employees is clearly evidenced by the consistent
course of conduct which it followed. Defendant promptly
rejected plaintiffs' first claim for wages on the grounds
that plaintiffs were not deemed employees but inde-
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pPn<lPnt contractors preparing to commence performance
under a 1nining contract between Elba Justice and def€'ndant, and clearly infonned plaintiffs thereof. Plaintiffs were never on defendant's payroll and therefore
eould not possibly have been separated therefrom as
the statute requires. Hence, defendant, being unable to
separate those never connected with it in the capacity
required by the statute, cannot constitutionally be penalized for such "separation."
It is not the intent of the statute to require a defendant to pay any and all demands f.or wages made
by any persons having some relationship with defendant,
regardless of however poorly defined such relationship
n1ay subsequently be determined to have been. It therefore 1nay fairly be asked, does the intent of the Utah
statute extend to the instant case~ Looking to the language of the statute itself no intent to include or exclude application of the penalty provision when the
existence of an employment contract is disputed is explicit within its phraseology. However, the 'vhole tenor
of the statute presumes such relationship already to
have been firmly established, as it speaks of the duties
and rights of an "employer" and ''employee." The provisions of Title 34-10-6 speak not of disputes as to
1chether wages are due, but only of disputes as to the
amount due when it is conceded by the "employer" that
some amount is due as "wages."
The presence in this case of a bona fide dispute
as to plaintiffs' status, shown in defendant's refusal to
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acknowledge plaintiffs' claim for wages, and its consistent denial of the existence of the required employeremployee relationship, raising a bona fide dispute as to
the very relationship which forms the crux of the
statute, impels the conclusion that the statute was not
intended to apply in a case such as this and that the
lower court erred in applying the statute in this case.

POINT II.
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALI'TY OF TITLE 34, SECTIO,N 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH ·CODE ANNOTATED (1953)
WAS ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A. SAID STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON
ITS FACE, CONSTITUTING A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW TO
EMPLOYERS BY VIRTUALLY DENYING TO 'THEM THEIR
DAY IN CO·URT UNDER THREAT OF EXCESSIVE PENAL·TY.

A thorough search of cases involving Title 34-106(a) U.C.A. (1953) and similar statutes reveals no
previous decision by any court of the precise question
raised by this action, i.e., the constitutionality of applying
the penalty wage provision when the existence of an
employment contract is contested. Analogous and related decisions, however, offer strong persuasion for
declaring such an application unconstitutional.
In 1923 the Supreme Court of Indiana declared
unconstitutional a statute providing that upon failure
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b~·

an Ptnployer to pay within 7:2 hours of separation
ol' an Plllployee and upon dernand for payrnent all \vages
due said en1plo~·ep, a penalty equal to the daily ",.age
\rotlld accrue until the arnount O\ved \Vas paid. f3tate v.
illarti u. 193 Ind. 1:20, 139 N.E. :2S:2 ( 1923). RPeognizing
the po\rers of the state to irnpose p~enalties for the
protection of certain community interests, the court coneluded that the state, by the enactment of said legislation, had · 'thereh~· transcended its po\rers, and hy that
rneans denied to its citizens thus affected the benefit
of the fundamental right of 'due process' and 'equal
protection of the laws' guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Citing an earlier Indiana case which declared unconstitutional a penalty of 10% of the "·ages
o"·ing until paid, the court quoted:
"Under the provision of this statute if wages
should be demanded by an employee which the
en1ployer denies owing or claims to have been
paid, the lapse of 10 days consumed in negotiation
or litigation will double the debt, and each succeeding 10 days \vill add to it as muc.h as "·as
owing in the first place. The fact, if it be a fact,
that the employee has demanded more than is
due him will not prevent the actual debt from
doubling, neither will the good faith belief on the
part of the employer that he has paid all that
was due ...
''The penalty is not proportioned to the
amount of wages \vithheld, but is \vithout limit
as to the time during \vhich it shall continue to
accumulate, or as to the total amount. This is not
'equal protection of the law' nor does it afford
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the employer 'due process of law,' but arbitrarily
deprives him of property by threatening such
dire consequences if he shall litigate a claim for
wages and not be entirely successful, that he may
fear to refuse a demand, even though convinced
that it is unfounded and unjust. . ." Superior
Laundry Co. v. Rase ________ Ind. ________ 137 N.E. 761
(1923).
The existence of an employer-employee relationship
was not in issue in these cases, and the time 'vas not
limited as is attempted under the Utah statute. But the
controlling concern of the court "Tas the arbitrary
deprivation of the employer's property without due
process of law by threatening such dire consequences
should his litigation of a claim for wages fail, either
in whole or in part, that a mere demand for wages,
although unfounded and unjust, would coerce the employer into paying the demanded sum, being thereby
compelled to bring an action for its recovery and to
bear the burden of proof therein.
A similar concern 'vas expresed by the Supreme
C-ourt of the United States in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 146, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S:Ct. 441 (1908) where it
declared unconstitutional on its face a state statute
providing for the establishment of rates for railroad
transportation and which fixed penalties for the disobedience of its provisions so severe as to intimidate
the corporations and their officers from resorting to
the courts to test the validity of the rates. The grounds
upon which the court declared its decision to rest was
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that it deprived the corporation of the equal protection
of the la\\'~. Uiting exatnples "'here resort to judicial
proee~~ is directly denied, the court states:
~~A

la \V which indirectly aceomplishes a like
result b~~ imposing such conditions upon the right
to appeal for judicial relief as work an abandonment of the right rather than face the conditions
upon \vhich it is offered or may be obtained is
also unconstitutional."
.l\gain, in Catting c. Goddard, 183 l'".S. 79, -±6 L.Ed.
9~, ~:2 ~up. Ct. 30 (1901) the Supreme Court denounced
the validity of a penalty provision for violation of a
state statute by offering the following hypothetical:
'~Suppose

a la\v which, while opening the
doors of the courts to all litigants, provided
that a failure of any plaintiff or defendant to
make good his entire claim or entire defense
should subject him to a forfeiture of all his
property or to some other great penalty; then,
even if, as all litigants were treated alike, it
could be said that there was equal protection of
the laws, would not such burden upon all be adjudged a denial of due process of law~
''Of course, these are extreme illustrations,
and they serve only to illustrate the proposition
that a statute (although in terms opening the
doors of the courts to a particular litigant) which
places a burden so great as to practically intimidate him from asserting that which he believes
to be his rights is, \vhen no such penalty is inflicted upon others, tantamount to a denial of
the equal protection of the laws.
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". . . It is doubtless true that the state may
impose penalties such as will tend to compel
obedience to its mandates by all, individuals or
corporations; and if extreme and cumulative penalties are imposed only after there has been a
final determinat~on of the validity of the statute,
the question would be very different from that
here presented. But \vhen the legislature, in an
effort to prevent any inquiry of the validity of a
particular statute, so burdens any challenge
thereof in the court that the party affected is
necessarily constrained to submit rather than
take the chances of the penalties imposed, then
it becomes a serious question whether the party
is not deprived of the equal protection of the
laws." p. 102 (Emphasis added).
Accord: Sparkman v. County Budget Commission, 103
Fla. 242; 137 So. 809 (1931).
Following the procedure of the Supreme ·Court in
Catting v. Goddard, let us pose the extreme possibility
under the statute in question for the purpose of pointing up the principle of its application. Suppose that a
laborer on the last day of a given pay period begins
performing work for a certain corporation as an independent contractor. At the close of the day he asserts
status as an employee, which assertion is denied in good
faith by the corporation. The laborer thereupon ceases
working and waits for 58 days before making denmnd
for payment of the one day's wage and, up·on refusal
and failure by the corporation to pay within 24 hours
thereafter, files an action under Title 34-10-6( a) demanding one day's wage plus the equivalent of 59 days'
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wages at the daily rate as penalty. l(no,ving that the
provisions of Title 3-1-10-6 and 7 apply only \vhen there
exists an employer-employee relationship bet\veen the
parties, the corporation feels no obligation to pay either
'vages or any sum under the breached contract. Assu1ne
the agreement for independent contracting had not yet
been reduced to \Yriting and that therefore at trial the
corporation is unable to offer conclusive evidence of
the existence of such a contract. Taking notice of the
fact that some labor had been performed \vhich presumably benefited the corporation, the court concludes
that there is only evidence to support an employeremployee contract. Without the opportunity of first
having its day in court, the corporation is thereby
retroactively subjected to a penalty bearing a ratio to
the actual wage claimed of 5,900%.
The invalidity of this type of cumulative penalty
statute is explained in 23 Am. J ur. at page 631 as follows:
"A statute which provides a continuing penalty of so many dollars a day for a violation but
which leaves it within the discretion of the person in whose favor the penalty is assessed to
bring suit at any time \vithin the statute of limitations, giving him the opportunity to make the
penalty cumulative in a manner \vholly disproportionate to any loss suffered and also
oppressive, is unreasonable and violates the constitution."
Such a statute was struck down by the court in
Beckler Produce Company v. Anzerican Rail1cay Ex-
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press Conlpany, 156 Ark. 296, 246 S.W. 1, (1922), an
action brought against the defendant company for damages for loss of fruit \vhich the defendant failed to deliver, plus a $2.00 per day penalty as provided in the
Arkansas statute for failure on the part of defendant to
settle the clai1n of the plaintiff \vithin 20 days. In declaring the unconstitutionality of the statute the court
said:
"The statute provides a continuing penalty
of $2.00 per day and leaves it to the discretion
of the owner of the goods to bring suit at any
time within the period of the statute of limitations."
Accord: A1nerican Railway Express Co. v. Bratton, 158
Ark. 639; 247 S.W. 379, (1923).
Any statute with such a potential result must be
declared unconstitutional, including the statute here in
question which allows the alleged employee to choose
his o\vn time for making demands and filing suit, thus
allowing the penalty to accumulate for the entire period
of the 60 day statute of limitations which is 1nade an
integral part of the statute.
In the analogous area of compliance "ith orders of
administrative tribunals, the courts have universally
held that when the application of the order is contested
in the eourts, penalties may not attach until a reasonable time after the validity of the order is established
by judicial decree. In Natural Gas Pzpeline Co. v. Slat-
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L.Ed. 276, r>~ ~. ( t. 199 ( 1937),
tlu~ f'Pderal ~upremP ( ourt refused application of a
statutory penalty provision prior to issuanee of a deerPP determining the validity of the admini~trative order,
and for a reasonable time thereafter, stating:

tery.

:~0:2 U.~.

300;

~:2

1

1

~~A~

the Act in1poses penalties of fro1n $500
to $2,000 a day for failure to comply \Yith the
order, any application of the s~atute subjecting
appellant to the risk of the cumulative penalties
pending an attempt to test thP validit~~ of the
order in the courts and for a reasonable time aftPr
decision would be a denial of due process.''
The indeterminate amount of the penalty there \Yas
dependant upon the definition of what constituted a
violation. A similar effect, however, is possible under
the statute now before the court, as exemplified by the
case at bar. Since the specific time for 1naking demand
of payment within the 60 day period allowed by the
statute is left to the discretion of the individual claimant,
the amount of the penalty imposed is deter1nined by the
ti1ne at which the alleged employee elects to Inake such
de1nand and thereafter to file suit. Diligence in making
demand for payment and filing the action thus \Yorks
to dimish the penalty damages which become collectible,
thereby encouraging delay to the detriment of the alleged employer.
Further increase of the amount of the penalty can
be effected under the statute (evidenced by the instant
case) by joining in the action for recovery of wages
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and penalties the claims of persons whom the corporation believes to be sub-contractors or employees of the
private contractor. The unlimited number of such potential claimants plus their opportunity to enlarge their
claims by virtue of their own delay, render meaningless
the \\Tording of the statute attempting to make the penalty
proportionate to the claim.
Even \vhen the existence of an employment contract
bet\veen the parties is not at issue there is strong reason
for disallo,ving the application of such penalty provisions prior to determination by proper adjudication
of the amount due. The state of Kansas declared unconstitutional a similar penalty statute, offering the
fallowing explanation:
"It would not do to say that every time an
employee's service with a company was terminated and there was a dispute about the amount
due, the company should be made to pay a penalty for not paying the amount demanded, especially \vhen it after\vard turned out that the
company \vas right. To so hold would permit
unscrupulous employees to make demands they
knew \vould not be met, and later bring an action
for penalties. The statute \vas not intended to
bring about such a result." Gau,throp v . .~!issouri
.
Pac. Ry. Co., 147 l{an. 756, 78 P.2d 85-1, (1938).
Even if the existence of an e1nployment relationship
were to be presumed, there still remaining a bona fide
dispute as to the amount of wages due, pay1nent of the
portion \vhirh is not disputed, as required by Section
7 of the same chapter, would in no \Yay diminish the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
atnount of the penalty. As presently worded the penalty
\vagP <'onnnences 2-t hours after separation and does
not wait for final adjudication of the dispute. Failure,
therefore, to make good the entire clai1n will impose
rPtroa<'tively the entire penalty, since the a Jno1ult of
the penalty is related not to the a Jnou nt of 1cages in
dispute, but to flu~ a1no u nt of the daily 1rage ear ued by
the entplo.lJee. Hence, if an e1nployer acknowledges and
pays $99.00 and a court thereafter declares $100.00 to
have been owed, upon delay by the employee in making
demand and filing an action, a penalty equal to 60 days'
wages may attach in addition to the One Dollar actually
owed as wages.
The type of statute here in question, being penal in
.nature, requires strict interpretation and should be applied only when the parties involved come strictly within
its provisions (Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co.
t·s. D. L. Russell, supra). It therefore follows that courts
should be reluctant to apply such statutes having grave
consequence and impact upon the constitutional rights
of the defendant without first liberally interpreting the
statute at hand to insure the defendant's constitutional
rights will not be infringed. The advisability of so
construing their similar statute liberally has been announced and followed by the Idaho courts. Goodell v.
Pope-Shenon Mining Co., 36 Ida. 427, 212 P. 3-l-2 (1922).
That equitable defenses should be allowed has also been
given 'vide approval. Bielstein v. Hawkins and Chester
v. Da £,·i.s, supra.
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The object of the statute 1n question is to secure
pro1npt payment to employees of wages "\vhich might
otherwise be withheld without good cause, not the foreclosing by threat of penalty and criminal punishment
the right of parties to a fair hearing and competent
judicial deter1nination of their status. "Due process of
la"\\'",'' stated the l~tah court in Riggins v. District Cottrt
of Salt Lake County, 80 U. 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935),
''requires that notice be given to the persons "\vhose
rights are to be affected. It hears before it condemns,
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial." Thus in Republic I ron & Steel Co. vs. Sbate, 160
Ind. 379, 66 N.E. 1005 (1903), the court disallowed appication of a penalty statute which provided that after
judicial determination that wages were due, a plaintiff
might have judgtnent not only for the amount of the
"\vages but also for a 50% penalty together "'"ith interest,
stating that such statute "\vorked an unconstituional
deprivation of the defendant's right to due process of
la"\v and indicating it would be improper for a court
to inflict retroactively such a severe penalty merely
because the defendant did not prevail on the ~ssue of
the plaintiff's claim for wages. In Jensen v. [ 7• P. Ry.
Co., 6 U. 253, 21 P. 994, the court further declared,
Due process of la\Y comes to us from the Great Charter
and is synono1nous "\Yith la"\v of the land.' It means
that a party shall have his day in court." A citizen cannot properly be said to have been offered his day in
court when, upon eventual failure to convince the court
of the merits of his claim or defense, he must pay an
4 4

4
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exorbitant penalty for that privilege being compelled
to suffer the pffects of a penaty statute retroactivPly
applied. He must fi'rst have the issue resolved as to
his liability to pay the claim made against him and
thPreafter, and only thereafter, be burdened \vith nny
penalty for failure to pay the claim.
Defendant respectfully submits that application of
the penalty provision of Title 3±-10-6(a) U.C.A. (1953)
was intended to prevent undue delay in payment of
\vages to employees when no good cause therefor exists,
but that its application when the existence of an employer-employee relationship is drawn seriously in to
question is beyond the intent and the fair meaning of
the statute. Such application is a denial of due process
of la\v as secured by the Utah Constitution and is contrary to the spirit and letter of provisions of the federal
Constitution guaranteeing due process of law and equal
protection of the laws. The apparent relation of the
penalty to alleged wages owed is rendered meaningless
in the application thereof, thus constituting an unreasonable penalty. Common principles of fairness favor keeping unrestricted and uninhibited the right to a fair
judicial hearing without fear of incurring or increasing
undue penalties in the attempt. The statute as presently
constructed lends itself to abuse by intentional delay
on the part of a claimant thereunder, who under the
present construction of the statute has the option to
render the statute cumulative in effect, the possibility
of \Vhich abuse should not be granted enlarged scope
through -interpretation. A liberal construction of the
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statute to effect its object and the promotion of justice
Is both required and desirable.
B. SAID STATUTE IS UNCONSTTTUTIONAL AS
APPLIED TO THE CASE AT BAR, CONSTITUTING A
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PRO'TECTION OF THE LAW TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,
AN ALLEGED EMPLOYER, WHERE THERE EXISTS A
BONA FIDE DISPUTE AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, BY VIRTUALLY
DENYING TO IT ITS DAY IN COURT UNDER THREAT
OF EXCESSIVE PENALTY.

The rights of due process of law and equal protection of the laws are secured to the defendant herein
by the Fourteenth .A.mendrrient to the federal Constitution, which states:
" ... nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, ''ithout due process
of law; nor deny to any person "\\i.thin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the la"\Ys."
That a corporation is a "person" "\Yithin the meaning
of this amendment 'vas established by the Supreme
Court of the linited States in Kentucky Finance Corporati·on vs. Paranrount Auto Exchange Corporation,
262 lT.S. G~~' 67 L.Ed 1112, -1:3 S.Ct. 636 (1923).
In addition to the federal guarantees, the ·Constitution of th0 State of Utah specifically secures the right
of due process of la'Y in the following language:

··Due Process of Lau': No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property "ithout due
process of la"?·" Utah Const. Art. I, Sect. 7.
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The si1nilarity of this elause to the Fifth and Fourteenth
A1nendtnents of the fP<leral constitution has led the
~upren1e l ourt of Utah to declare decisions by the
federal Supre1ne Court to be highly persuasive in int(•rpreting· the l ,.tah provision. Unter1nyer v. State Tax
Conun£ssion, 102 U. 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942).
1

\Vhat then is the effect of applying the lTtah statute
here in question to defendant 'vith reference to its
constitutional rights as set forth above f
1. First, it clearly operates as an inti1nidation
against this defendant to deter it from contesting plaintiffs' claim at the risk of losing on the merits and being
burdened with an excessive penalty. Plaintiffs' original
wTitten notice to defendant setting forth plaintiffs' claim
for wages allegedly owed to them by the defendant
stated:
~'We

feel that your company has laid themselves wide open to severe penalty for failure to
pay these men at the time they were separated
from the payroll. However, if you will send us
the following amounts we will consider the pay·ment in full of all claims which they might have
against your company."
It then sets forth the amounts which palintiffs claimed
as wages. Having a good faith belief that plaintiffs
were not employees, defendant should have been allowed
the right as secured by the federal and state constitutions to dispute that claim without being forced to
proceed under the threat contained in plaintiffs' letter
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that if their claim was not paid in cash they would
utilize the penalty provision of the statute and severely
burden the defendant. In spite of this threat and intimidation inherent in the statute and expressed in plaintiffs' letter, defendant chose to proceed to trial on the
1nerits of its dispute as to the employer-employee relationship alleged by plaintiffs to exist, and no\Y n1ust
be required to pay the sum of $2,715.00 for the privilege
of so going to court unless the holding of the lower
court regarding application of this penalty statute is
reversed. Without such reversal the constitutional rights
of the defendant corporation to due process of law
and equal protection of the law shall have been permanently infringed. The doctrine of the Super~or Laundry
(}ompany, Ex Parte Young, Catting, Martin, Sparkman,
Beckler and Republic Iron & Steel cases, supra, compel
a reversal of the holding of the lower court unconstitutionally applying this penalty statute to the defendant.
2. The application of the Utah statute in this
case operates as a retroactive denial of due process
to the defendant by charging it with a penalty commencing not at the date of judgment determining the existence of the required employer-employee relationship, but
from the date of termination of plaintiffs' labor. Such
an application should not be allowed under the doctrine
set forth in Republic I ron & Steel Co. ·vs. State, supra.
A statute \vhich in that case \vould have burdened the
defendant \vith a 50% penalty after judicial determination that the defendant owed wages, and for that reason
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declared uneonstitutional, is transcened 1n rs unconstitutionality by the statute in this case \vhich retroactively
infli<'ts a penalty upon the defendant in an amount nearly three tin1es as great as the arnoun t determined by
the lo\vPr court to have been due as \vages. The spirit
and tradition of our federal and state constitutions do
not allo\v such a retroactive denial of due process.
3. The application of the statute in this case
operates as a eurnulative, unreasonable, and burdensome
penalty upon the defendant. Although limiting to 60
day8 the tirne during \vhich a penalty rnay accrue and
incorporating a 60-day statute of liinitations in an effort
to raise itself to the elevated sanctuary of constitutionality, the statute must fall because of its failure to
designate when, in relation to the time when the penalty
begins to accrue, the plaintiff ( s) must make demand for
wages. The plaintiffs herein who ceased their labors on
the 1st day of October not only waited untif the 15th
day of October to communicate their demand to defendant, but bided their time until the 30th day of November
to file their suit, thereby exploiting to the fullest the
cumulative possibilities of the statute. Thus \vhen the
lower court detennined the plaintiffs to have been employees and went on to apply the penalty statute, the
resulting amount was not limited by any statutory requirement that plaintiffs 1nake their demands immediately upon separation or file their action 'Yithin a
reasonable time after separation and thus terminate
the period during 'vhich the penalty might accumulate.
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Instead, plaintiffs \Vere granted penalty wages for the
full 60 day period of lin1itations incorporated in the
statute itself. This effect \Vould not have been produced
but for the deliberate choice on the part of the plaintiffs
to wait before filing their action until such time as a
judgment for penalty could gain for them the maximum
amount allowed under the statute and not some lesser
amount. This effect renders the statute unconstitutional.

CONCLUSIONS
It is respectively submitted that upon the facts of
this case the statute in question by its own terms is
not applicable here, for the reason that the relationship
which constitutes the very heart of the statute and
the very reason for its existence was, in the belief of
the defendant, missing. To extend the statute beyond
its intended purpose is to thwart the intent of the
legislature and unnecessarily punish this defendant.
Even assuming applieabilty of the penalty statute
is this case, it is unconstitutional because of its extreme
possibilities for denying due process and equal protection of the la\v by threatening an alleged employer
\vho disputes bona fide a clai1nant's demand for wages
\vith the imposition, retroactively, of an exorbitant and
cmnulative penalty, should his claim or defense fail in
\vhole or· in part. The statute clearly constitutes an unconstitutional "price of admission" for the day in court
to \vhich a defendant is entitled "free of charge."
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The judgment entered by the court at once charged
the defendant 'vith wages in the sum of $1,000.00 plus
interest, and also a penalty in an amount nearly three
ti1nes as great. In computing the penalty·, the court
reached back in time before the adjudication of the
issue of plaintiffs' relationship to defendant to the time
'vhen the relationship was terminated. This is a reallife application of the retroactive nature of this cumulative and burdensome penalty provision. Thus, because
of manipulation by plaintiffs to utilize the full effect
of the statute, defendant has been charged with the
sum of $2,715.00 for the privilege of having its day
in court, the constitutional right which defendant should
have had the opportunity of exercising unencumbered
by the threats of plaintiffs or statute.
For these reasons it is respectfully submitted that
the holding of the lower court wherein it applied Title
3-t, ·Chapter 10, Section 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
to this defendant was error and should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

R. WILLIAl\I BRADFORD, JR.
for Jensen, Jensen & Bradford
Attorneys for Defendant
141-! Walker Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah.
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